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INTRODUCTION
Maria Alvarez, Gary Branson, and Max Galvan share a common
misfortune. Maria Alvarez was a janitor who cleaned theaters in Los An-
geles, California, where she earned about $5 per hour with no days off,
sick days, or holidays.1 This was until she was fired after being injured
on the job and requesting a lighter workload.2 Gary Branson drives 60
hours per week for Uber and is still homeless.3 Max Galvan is a truck
driver in Southern California making only $10 per hour despite working
for the same company more than 13 years.4 These workers share the
common fate of being misclassified as independent contractors, and
thereby being deprived of access to basic employee protections and bene-
fits.5 Some employers misclassify their employees as independent con-
tractors to reduce their labor costs, such as workers’ compensation
insurance, payroll taxes, and wages.6 Misclassification is highly preva-
lent in trucking, construction, and janitorial services.7 Most recently, in-
dependent contractor misclassification has also been notable in the gig
economy.8
The gig economy is a collection of markets that connects consumers
with on-demand service providers (“gig workers”), and it has revolution-
ized the way in which consumers seek and receive services, such as
transportation and household tasks.9 The ease of calling an Uber or Lyft,
as opposed to hailing a cab, led to a decrease in arrests for driving under
1 Gene Maddaus, How America’s Biggest Theater Chains are Exploiting Their Janitors, VA-
RIETY, https://variety.com/2019/biz/features/movie-theater-janitor-exploitation-1203170717/ (last
visited Dec. 30, 2019).
2 Id.
3 Carolyn Said, He Drives 60 Hours Per Week for Uber. He’s Still Homeless, Campaigns,
INDEP. DRIVERS GUILD, https://drivingguild.org/about/ (Sept. 23, 2019, 9:43 AM), https://www.sf-
chronicle.com/business/article/He-drives-60-hours-a-week-for-Uber-He-s-still-14457115.php.
4 Rebecca Smith et al., The Big Rig: Poverty, Pollution, and The Misclassification of Truck
Drivers at America’s Ports, NELP & CHANGE TO WIN 5 (Dec. 8, 2010), https://teamster.org/sites/
teamster.org/files/povertypollutionandmisclassification.pdf.
5 See Maddaus, supra note 1; Said, supra note 2; Smith supra note 3.
6 Catherine Ruckelshaus & Ceilidh Gao, Independent Contractor Misclassification Imposes
Huge Costs on Workers and Federal and State Treasuries, NELP (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nelp.
org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification-imposes-huge-costs-on-workers-and-fed
eral-and-state-treasuries-update-2017/.
7 See Dr. Lalith de Silva et al., Independent Contractors: Prevalence and Implications for
Unemployment Insurance Programs, PLANMATICS, INC. iii (Feb. 2000), http://wdr.doleta.gov/
owsdrr/00-5/00-5.pdf; Sara Hinkley et al., Race to the Bottom: How Low-Road Subcontracting Af-
fects Working Conditions in California’s Property Services Industry, UC BERKELEY LABOR CTR.
(Mar. 8, 2016), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2016/Race-to-the-Bottom.pdf.
8 Stephanie L. Alder-Paindiris, Independent Contractor Claims Proliferate, Nat’l Law Rev.
(Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/independent-contractor-claims-proliferate.
9 Nathan Heller, Is the Gig Economy Working?, NEW YORKER (May 15, 2017), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/15/is-the-gig-economy-working.
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the influence in major cities.10 Similarly, it transformed the way in which
many workers seek and perform work, as many gig workers enjoy flexi-
bility and control over their work schedule.11 Gig workers can work for
multiple platforms and also have authority over how much they work.12
Some have hailed that Uber and, more broadly, gig-economy work, rep-
resents the future of work,13 but this is a troubling proposition. Gig-econ-
omy work is largely founded on a model that relies on classifying most
of its workforce as independent contractors who, as opposed to employ-
ees, do not receive benefits such as overtime or sick pay and are not
covered by minimum-wage laws or workers’ compensation benefits.14
The increasing prevalence of employers classifying their workers as
independent contractors spurred a debate about when it is appropriate to
employ independent contractors, as opposed to employees. In April
2018, the California Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in
Dynamex Operations West v. Superior Court.15 Dynamex provided a
new test for determining whether a worker should be classified an em-
ployee or an independent contractor.16 The new test provides increased
protections against the misclassification of workers as independent con-
tractors by creating a presumption of employee status.17 In September
2019, the California Legislature codified the Dynamex test and clarified
its application by approving Assembly Bill 5 (“AB 5”).18
This Comment posits that the Dynamex decision created a dysfunc-
tional dichotomy by bringing many misclassified workers into the pur-
view of the Industrial Welfare Commission’s (“IWC”) Wage Orders,
while excluding the same workers from other protections and benefits
that employees are entitled to under the Labor Code. By codifying the
“ABC” Test into the Labor Code, AB 5 corrected some of the inconsis-
10 Gary Richards, DUI Arrests Down Sharply in California Cities – Thanks to Lyft and
Uber?, MERCURY NEWS (May 15, 2018, 12:12 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/05/10/
drunk-driving-arrests-decline-in-some-cities/.
11 James Sherk, The Rise of the “Gig” Economy: Good for Workers and Consumers, HERI-
TAGE FOUND. 3-4 (Oct. 7, 2016), http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/BG3143.pdf.
12 Sherk, supra note 10, at 6.
13 See, Lawrence Mishel, Uber and the Labor Market: Uber Drivers’ Compensation, Wages,
and the Scale of Uber and the Gig Economy, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1 (May 15, 2018), https://
www.epi.org/files/pdf/145552.pdf (commenting on Dispatches From the New Economy: The On-
Demand Economy and the Future of Work, INTUIT (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.slideshare.net/Intuit
Inc/dispatches-from-the-new-economy-the-ondemand-workforce-57613212/14-The_ondemand_
economy_is_accelerating).
14 Bloomberg Opinion Editorial Board, California Could be a Model for Gig Economy Fair-
ness, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 24, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-
24/california-gig-economy-regulations-a-grand-bargain-is-possible.
15 Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018).
16 Id. at 916.
17 Id. at 954-55.
18 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3 (2020).
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tency that Dynamex created. Nevertheless, while Dynamex and AB 5
provide a critical framework for combating misclassification and the re-
sulting worker exploitation, this Comment argues that they fall short of
bringing misclassified independent contractors into the purview of the
most important employee right: collective bargaining.
Accordingly, this Comment proposes a framework that would afford
misclassified independent contractors the right to collectively bargain
with the party employing them. This Comment explores the potential for
a statewide labor relations scheme specifically for independent contrac-
tors, as well as the guild model as pathways for collective bargaining.
Part I defines the problem of independent contractor misclassification
and provides an overview of the Dynamex decision, relevant back-
ground, and subsequent decisions interpreting Dynamex. Part II high-
lights the shortcomings of Dynamex in adequately addressing the
independent contractor problem. Part III discusses Assembly Bill 5 as a
promising solution to combating misclassification. Finally, Part IV pro-
vides recommendations for a path to collective bargaining for workers
misclassified as independent contractors.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION
While employees in the United States are largely protected by vari-
ous state and federal laws, workers classified as independent contractors
do not enjoy safeguards against exploitation and abuse.19 According to
the Internal Revenue Service, an independent contractor is someone who
is self-employed and performs services that are not subject to control by
an employer.20 The United States Department of Labor estimates that
there are 10.6 million workers classified as independent contractors in
the country.21 Employers may avoid costs and legal obligations by mis-
classifying workers as independent contractors.22 A study found that be-
tween 10% and 30% of employers misclassify their workers.23
19 See Catherine Ruckelshaus & Ceilidh Gao, Independent Contractor Misclassification Im-
poses Huge Costs on Workers and Federal and State Treasuries, NELP (Dec. 19, 2017), https://
www.nelp.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification-imposes-huge-costs-on-work
ers-and-federal-and-state-treasuries-update-2017/.
20 Internal Revenue Service, Independent Contractor Defined, IRS (last updated Apr. 24,
2018), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contractor-
defined.
21 Econ. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Contingent and Al-
ternative Emp’t Arrangements Summary (June 7, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/
conemp.nr0.htm.
22 Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An Analysis
of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53,
55 (2015).
23 de Silva et al., supra note 6.
4
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Misclassified workers are not entitled to minimum wage, overtime com-
pensation, family and medical leave, unemployment insurance, workers’
compensation benefits, or protections against workplace
discrimination.24
Worker misclassification may harm the labor market by providing
an unfair competitive advantage to employers who misclassify work-
ers.25 The Internal Revenue Service estimates that misclassification costs
federal revenues $1.6 billion annually.26 By avoiding increased labor
costs, businesses that misclassify workers gain an advantage over busi-
nesses that follow the law and incur corresponding labor costs.27 For
example, misclassifying employees shifts $831.4 million in unemploy-
ment insurance taxes and $2.54 billion in workers’ compensation premi-
ums to law-abiding businesses each year.28
When there is no clear standard for employers to discern who can be
an independent contractor or who can be an employee, employers strug-
gle to comply with the law. The employer may be incentivized to classify
workers according to the employer’s best interest rather than the legally
appropriate classification.29 Workers are even less likely than employers
to be aware of misclassification, or to pursue a remedy for
misclassification.30
In response to the growing number of statistics about the harms of
worker misclassification, several states across the country have enacted
statutes that alter the requirements for classifying a worker as an inde-
pendent contractor, and the enforcement structure against employers who
misclassify workers.31 Some states, such as Massachusetts, have adopted
the “ABC” Test in their statutory definition of independent contractor.32
The “ABC” Test is a three-prong test that consists of the following fac-
tors: (A) the worker is free from employer direction and control; (B) the
24 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Employee Misclassification as Independent Con-
tractors, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification/ (last visited
Nov. 15, 2018); Coverage, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/employ
ers/coverage.cfm (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
25 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-717, EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION: IM-
PROVED COORDINATION, OUTREACH, AND TARGETING COULD BETTER ENSURE DETECTION AND PRE-
VENTION 39 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/300/293679.pdf.
26 Id.
27 Sarah Leberstein & Catherine Ruckelshaus, Independent Contractor vs. Employee: Why




29 Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 21, at 65.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 58.
32 Id. at 65.
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service performed is outside the usual course of business of the em-
ployer; and (C) the individual is customarily engaged in an indepen-
dently established trade, profession, occupation, or business of the same
nature as that involved in the service performed.33 For example, under
Massachusetts’ “ABC” Test there is a presumption of employee status
that is rebuttable only when the employer can prove all three factors.34
The California Legislature adopted the “ABC” Test later. However,
the California Legislature recognized the harms that result from misclas-
sification as early as 2011, when it passed a law rendering it unlawful to
willfully misclassify individuals as independent contractors.35 The law
imposes civil penalties of $5,000 to $25,000 per violation.36
A. CALIFORNIA LAWS PROTECTING EMPLOYEES
The California Legislature created the Industrial Welfare Commis-
sion (“IWC”) in 1913 to regulate the hours, wages, and conditions of
employment.37 Though the IWC was founded to protect women and mi-
nors, its authority and scope has grown to include all employees in Cali-
fornia.38 The IWC issues Wage Orders setting meal and rest break
requirements, minimum wage, and overtime pay for employees.39 Pres-
ently, there are 18 different Wage Orders.40 Each Wage Order applies to
a discrete class of workers based on the nature of their work.41 For exam-
ple, Wage Order 9 applies to workers in the transportation industry and
includes provisions requiring that work is paid at one-and-one half the
rate of regular pay after eight hours and twice the rate of pay after 12
hours of work.42 It also requires that employers provide meal periods of
at least 30 minutes after five hours of work, among other things.43 It is
important to distinguish the Wage Orders, which govern the specifically
enumerated requirements therein, from the broader California Labor
Code, which is written and amended by the California Legislature.44
33 Id. at 65; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B(a)(1)-(3) (2014).
34 Id.; § 148B(a)(1)-(3) (2014).
35 S.B. 459, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
36 Id.
37 Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 52 (2010).
38 Id. at 55.
39 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11010 (2018).
40 Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 57.
41 Indus. Welf. Com’n Wage Order, CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. REL., https://www.dir.ca.gov/iwc/
wageorderindustriesprior.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).
42 Indus. Welfare Comm’n, WAGE ORDER No. 9-2001 § (3)(A)(1) (2001).
43 § (11)(A).
44 See generally, CAL. LAB. CODE.
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol50/iss2/6
2020] Comment 153
The California Labor Code offers a variety of protections and reme-
dies to employees.45 Some commonly asserted employee remedies under
the Labor Code include waiting time penalties and liquidated damages.46
While the Wage Orders mandate proper payment of the minimum wage
and overtime pay,47 Labor Code section 203 provides that where an em-
ployer willfully fails to pay any wages when an employee is discharged
or quits, waiting time penalties are assessed against the employer for an
amount equivalent to the employee’s daily rate, until the owed wages are
paid, for up to 30 days.48 Similarly, Labor Code section 1194.2 provides
that, when an employer fails to pay the minimum wage, the employee is
entitled to liquidated damages in the amount equal to the unpaid mini-
mum wages with interest.49 These two provisions help illustrate that the
Wage Orders and the Labor Code operate in conjunction when practi-
cally applied. Typically, when an employee brings a claim for Wage Or-
der violations, the employee may assert remedies under the Labor Code
simultaneously.50
When an employee suffers an injury arising out of the course of
employment and the injury is caused by the employment, the employee
will receive workers’ compensation benefits.51 Under Labor Code sec-
tion 3700, all California employers must provide workers’ compensation
insurance benefits to their employees.52 Workers’ compensation insur-
ance provides five basic benefits for injured employees or their survi-
vors: (1) medical costs to recover from a work-related injury; (2)
temporary disability benefits to cover lost wages while the employee re-
covers; (3) permanent disability benefits to compensate an employee
who does not fully recover; (4) supplemental job displacement benefits
to help pay for retraining or skill enhancement in the event the employee
does not fully recover; and (5) death benefits paid to survivors if an em-
ployee dies from a work-related injury.53 Workers’ compensation bene-
fits protect the employee as well as the employer, as employers are
45 See e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 203, 1194.2 (2019).
46 Id.
47 Indus. Welfare Comm’n, WAGE ORDER No. 9-2001.
48 Cal. Lab. Code § 203 (2019); GEORGE ABELE & KIRBY WILCOX, 1 MATTHEW BENDER
PRACTICE GUIDE: CALIFORNIA WAGES AND HOURS § 5.16(b)(1) (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
2018).
49 § 1194.2.
50 Labor Comm’n, Policies and Procedures for Wage Claim Processing, CAL. DEP’T OF IN-
DUS. REL., https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/policies.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
51 Edward Baskauskas, 2 CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAW § 20.20 (Kirby Wilcox et al. eds.,
Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 2019).
52 § 3700.
53 Division of Workers’ Comp., Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About Workers’
Compensation for Employees, CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. REL., https://www.dir.ca.gov/dwc/WCFaqIW.
html#5 (last visited Mar. 10, 2019).
7
Chavez: Comment
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2020
154 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
shielded from tort liability for an injured worker under the exclusive-
remedy doctrine.54 Workers’ compensation benefits do not extend to in-
dependent contractors, despite the fact that they may extend to minors,
prison inmates, and undocumented workers.55
Finally, collective bargaining is an important right only afforded to
employees and not independent contractors. Collective bargaining is the
process by which employees negotiate collectively with their employers
over working conditions.56 In the private sector, collective bargaining is
governed by federal law under the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”).57 The NLRA aims to protect the rights of employees and
employers while encouraging collective bargaining.58 The NLRA explic-
itly excludes independent contractors from its definition of
“employee.”59
B. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS THE
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR PROBLEM IN ITS LANDMARK
DYNAMEX DECISION
1. Preceding Decisions
For almost three decades, prior to Dynamex, California used a multi-
factor test to determine employee versus independent contractor status:
the Borello test.60 The Borello test consists of the following factors: (1)
whether the employer has a “right to control” the manner and means of
the work completed; (2) the employer’s right to discharge the workers;
(3) whether the workers are engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(4) the nature of the work performed; (5) the skill required in the particu-
lar occupation; (6) whether the employer supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work; (7) the length of time for which the services
will be performed; (8) the method of payment; (9) whether the work is
part of the regular business of the employer; and (10) whether the parties
believed they were creating an employer-employee relationship.61 Under
Borello, the burden of proving employee status is on the worker.62
54 Baskauskas, supra note 50.
55 Id.
56 Ralph M. Goldstein, The Obligations of Collective Bargaining, 18 B.U. L. REV. 750, 751
(1938).
57 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2019).
58 § 151.
59 Id.
60 S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rel., 48 Cal. 3d 341, 351 (1989).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 349.
8
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After Borello and prior to Dynamex, two decisions clarified the defi-
nition of the term “to employ” under the California Wage Orders. In
Martinez v. Combs, agricultural workers sued their employer, a farming
company, and two produce merchants that did business with the farming
company.63 The workers claimed they were jointly employed by the pro-
duce merchants, such that the produce merchants were therefore liable
for unpaid minimum wages and penalties.64 The California Supreme
Court found that, under the Wage Orders, the term “to employ” had three
alternative definitions.65 First, it meant to exercise control over the
wages, hours or working conditions.66 Second, it also meant to “suffer or
permit to work,”67 meaning that the employer “knows or has to reason”
to know the worker works for them.68 Finally, “to employ” also means to
engage, thereby creating a common law employment relationship.69 The
court in Martinez found that the produce merchants had not employed
the agricultural workers under any of these three definitions.70
Four years later, Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc. added to
the discussion about the proper test to determine employee versus inde-
pendent contractor status.71 In Ayala, a group of newspaper carriers sued
the newspaper company they worked for, alleging Wage Order violations
and that the company misclassified them as independent contractors.72
First, the court needed to discern whether the workers were employees to
determine whether the class could properly be certified for a class-action
suit.73 Here, the court had the opportunity to decide whether it would
apply Martinez to find an employment relationship under any of the
three definitions of “employ” in the Wage Orders, or whether it would
apply the traditional multi-factor test.74 The court deliberately decided
not to rule on which test should govern and stated that it was a “question
for another day.”75 Accordingly, the court used the Borello test because
the plaintiff’s theory was that they were employees under the Borello
test.76 The court ultimately remanded the case for further proceedings to
63 Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 42-43.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 64.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal. 4th 575, 585 (2000).
69 Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 64.
70 Id. at 77.
71 Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522, 531 (2014).
72 Id. at 528-29.
73 Id. at 529.
74 Id. at 530-31.
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give the trial court an opportunity to reach a decision applying the proper
legal inquiry.77
2. The Dynamex Decision
The plaintiffs in Dynamex were parcel delivery drivers for a courier
and delivery-service company that operated a number of business centers
in California.78 Prior to 2004, Dynamex classified its California drivers
as employees, but in 2004 it converted all its drivers to independent con-
tractors upon concluding that the conversion would generate economic
savings for the company.79 The drivers brought suit claiming they were
incorrectly classified as independent contractors as opposed to employ-
ees.80 They also claimed that Dynamex violated provisions in the Cali-
fornia Wage Orders as well as the Labor Code.81
Though the trial court initially denied class certification, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal reversed, and the trial court eventually certified the
class in 2011.82 While the plaintiffs asserted that the new legal standard
from Martinez was the correct standard to determine employee versus
independent contractor status, Dynamex contended that Martinez did not
apply.83 Dynamex argued that Martinez strictly applied to questions of
joint-employer status and not to determine independent contractor sta-
tus.84 Instead, Dynamex argued that Borello was the correct standard to
determine whether the plaintiffs were employees or independent contrac-
tors.85 Under the Borello standard, it is more difficult to prove that a
worker is an employee.86 The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs’ posi-
tion, stating that Martinez was not limited to joint-employment questions
and that the Martinez decision represents a “redefinition of the employ-
ment relationship.”87
In 2012, Dynamex renewed its previous motion to decertify the
class.88 The trial court denied the motion and Dynamex appealed.89 The
77 Id. at 540.
78 Dynamex Operations W., 4 Cal. 5th at 917.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 919.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 919-20.
83 Id.at 920-21.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 921.
86 C.f. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d at 355-59, with Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 42-43
(The Borello test consists of a multi-factor assessment, whereas the Martinez test provides for three
alternative definitions of employment.)
87 Dynamex Operations W., 4 Cal. 5th at 92.
88 Id. at 924.
89 Id.
10
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California Court of Appeal approved Dynamex’s motion regarding to the
claims arising from Labor Code violations.90 However, it denied the mo-
tion for claims arising from Wage Order violations, holding that the Mar-
tinez test was proper for Wage Order claims, but not for Labor Code
claims.91 Then Dynamex petitioned for review of the appellate court’s
conclusion that the Wage Order definitions of “to employ” and “em-
ployer,” as construed by Martinez, may be relied on to determine
whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor under the
California Wage Orders.92
The California Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s deci-
sion and concluded that the second alternative definition of “to employ”
and “employer” in the Wage Orders, “to suffer or permit to work,” prop-
erly applies to the question of whether a worker should be classified as
an employee or independent contractor.93 The court noted that the legis-
lature intended expansive reach of the “suffer or permit to work” stan-
dard as a means of providing maximum protections to workers and law-
abiding businesses.94 It further asserted that the standard must be inter-
preted and applied broadly to include all workers who can “reasonably
be viewed as working in the hiring entity’s business.”95 The court also
expressed concern that multi-factor tests that consider “all the circum-
stances,” like Borello, afford businesses greater opportunity to evade
wage and hour laws.96 As a consequence, the court presented a new
three-prong test to determine whether a worker has been “suffer[ed] or
permit[ted] to work” and is thus an employee or an independent contrac-
tor under the California Wage Orders.97
Under the new standard, there is a presumption that the worker is an
employee.98 The employer may overcome the presumption by establish-
ing each of the three factors in the following “ABC” Test:
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hiring
entity in connection with the performance of the work, both under the
contract for the performance of the work and in fact; and
(B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of
the hiring entity’s business; and
90 Id. at 924-25.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 925.
93 Id. at 943.
94 Id. at 952-53.
95 Id. at 953 (2018) (alteration omitted) (quoting Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 49).
96 Id. at 954.
97 Id. at 956-57.
98 Id. at 957.
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(C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently estab-
lished trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work
performed.99
To satisfy the “A” prong, workers must be free from the hiring party’s
control as well as from the actual control of the hiring party regarding the
manner and detail of the work performed.100 The “B” prong seeks to
distinguish work that is traditionally performed by employees versus
work that is traditionally performed by independent contractors.101 The
court offers two opposing examples: a plumber repairing a leak at a retail
store and a seamstress making dresses in her home for a clothes manu-
facturing business.102 The first is an example of an independent contrac-
tor relationship, while the second is an example of an employment
relationship.103 Finally, prong “C” seeks to differentiate situations where
the worker has “independently chosen the burdens and benefits of self-
employment” from those where workers have been subjected to the inde-
pendent contractor label through unilateral action by the hiring entity.104
3. Subsequent Decisions
Though the Dynamex decision was issued less than two years
ago,105 California courts have interpreted the limitations of Dynamex.106
In Curry v. Equilon Enterprises, a service station manager brought suit
against the owner of the gas station where she worked, Equilon Enter-
prises.107 The plaintiff alleged several Wage Order violations, including
failure to pay overtime and missed break periods.108 The plaintiff signed
an employment contract with American Retail Services, a limited liabil-
ity company that had a multi-site operations contract with Shell.109 The
plaintiff argued that Shell was a joint-employer and suggested that the
“ABC” Test should be used to define “suffer or permit to work” in the
joint-employer analysis.110 The California Court of Appeal reasoned that
the California Supreme Court’s analysis in formulating the “ABC” Test
99 Id. at 957 (emphasis in original).
100 Id. at 958.
101 Id. at 959.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 960.
104 Id. at 962 (quoting S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d at 354).
105 Id. at 903.
106 See e.g., Curry v. Equilon Enters., 23 Cal. App. 5th 289 (2018); Garcia v. Border Transp.
Grp., 28 Cal. App. 5th 558 (2018).
107 Curry, 23 Cal. App. 5th at 292.
108 Id. at 292-93.
109 Id.at 294-95.
110 Id. at 312.
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was rooted in policy reasons uniquely related to the issue of misclassifi-
cation.111 Therefore, the court found that placing the burden on the em-
ployer to prove the “ABC” Test factors in order to absolve itself of joint-
employer liability does not serve the policy goals the court intended in
Dynamex.112 In sum, this decision established that the “ABC” Test may
not be used to establish joint employment.
Another recent case that highlighted the limitations of Dynamex is
Garcia v. Border Transportation Group.113 In Garcia, a taxi driver sued
Border Transportation, the company he worked for as a driver, alleging
several claims under the Wage Orders as well as claims not under the
Wage Orders.114 The trial court granted summary judgment for the Bor-
der Transportation, finding that Garcia was an independent contractor
under Borello.115 By the time the case reached the California Court of
Appeal, Dynamex was decided by the California Supreme Court.116
Hence, the Court of Appeal applied the “ABC” Test to Garcia’s Wage
Order claims and reversed summary judgement, finding that he was an
employee.117 However, the court noted that Borello remained the proper
test to determine employee versus independent contractor status for non-
Wage Order claims.118 The court further noted that Borello remained the
standard for workers’ compensation.119 Though Dynamex was explicit in
that it did not apply to non-Wage Order claims, Garcia clarified this
point further.120 Garcia exemplifies situations where California workers
may be found to be employees under the Wage Orders but not under the
Labor Code.
II. THE NARROW SCOPE OF DYNAMEX CREATES AN UNWORKABLE
DICHOTOMY
Overall, the “ABC” Test provides increased protections against mis-
classification by creating a presumption of employee status, setting a
high threshold for overcoming the presumption by requiring that all three
prongs must be satisfied, and by setting forth a clear test that is accessi-
ble for employers and workers alike. Nevertheless, because the court’s
decision was narrowly tailored to the Wage Orders exclusively, the
111 Id. at 314.
112 Id.
113 Garcia, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 558.
114 Id. at 563-64.
115 Id. at 564.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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“ABC” Test was only useful to determine a worker’s status as it related
to Wage Orders because it did not apply to determining employee status
for claims arising out of the Labor Code or workers’ compensation.121
The California Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that the absence
of an easily and consistently applied standard “leaves both businesses
and workers in the dark with respect to basic questions relating to wages
and working conditions that arise regularly.”122 The narrow applicability
of its “ABC” Test to Wage Order claims exacerbated the very problem
the court acknowledged.
While the “ABC” Test brought many misclassified workers into the
purview of the IWC’s Wage Orders, ensuring proper payment of the
minimum wage and overtime pay, the same workers remained excluded
from other protections and benefits that employees are entitled to. This
dichotomy offered employers seeking to violate the law new opportuni-
ties to evade responsibility. It also created potential for confusion for
law-abiding employers and workers seeking to assert their rights.
The penalties set forth in the Labor Code serve to deter employers
from violating the law.123 This deterrent effect serves the “critically im-
portant objectives” of the Wage Orders as stated by the Dynamex court:
to benefit both workers and law-abiding businesses by eliminating the
competitive advantage enjoyed by employers who offer substandard
wages.124 When workers are classified as employees under the Wage Or-
ders, but not under the Labor Code, these workers are denied some of the
remedies designed to make employees whole and deter misconduct by
employees. By creating a two-tiered system where workers found to be
employees under Borello have access to these remedies, and workers
found to be employees under Dynamex do not, California effectively un-
dermined its wage and hour laws.
Workers’ compensation protections further illustrate the dichotomy
between protections for employees under Dynamex as opposed to em-
ployees under Borello.125 A worker who met the standard to be an em-
ployee under the Dynamex “ABC” Test was not entitled to workers’
compensation benefits unless they also met the Borello standard.126 This
dichotomy allowed employers to lawfully exclude employees from work-
ers’ compensation benefits if the worker was not considered an employee
under Borello. This had the potential to create situations where employ-
121 Dynamex Operations W., 4 Cal. 5th at 943.
122 Id. at 954.
123 CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 203, 1194.2 (2019).
124 Dynamex Operations W., 4 Cal. 5th at 952.
125 See CAL. LAB. CODE, Div. 4, Pt. 1, Ch. 4 (2019).
126 See Garcia, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 571.
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ees who were injured in the course of employment did not have any
access to workers’ compensation benefits.
While Dynamex attempted to curb misclassification by providing a
more straightforward test to determine employee versus independent
contractor status, the narrow scope of the decision fell short of this objec-
tive. By limiting application of the “ABC” Test exclusively to the Wage
Orders, the decision failed to effectively limit opportunities for misclas-
sification. Furthermore, the exclusion of Dynamex employees from
workers’ compensation benefits made them even more vulnerable to mis-
classification. After this decision, workers considered employees under
Dynamex could justifiably rely on their employee status to bring them
into the purview of workers’ compensation, only to find out, once they
were injured, that they are not protected unless they were also employees
under Borello.
III. ASSEMBLY BILL 5 AS A PROMISING SOLUTION
After much debate, Assembly Bill 5 (“AB 5”) emerged as a promis-
ing solution to the uncertainty that Dynamex caused. In response to the
Dynamex decision, leading gig-economy companies and business groups
initially sought to undo the decision, while labor groups sought to clarify
and expand its application through executive and legislative action. Ma-
jor technology companies including Uber, Lyft, InstaCart, DoorDash,
PostMates, and TaskRabbit, argued that their business model would not
be viable if they were to implement traditional employee-employer struc-
tures.127 The California Chamber of Commerce also mobilized to garner
support from restaurant associations, retailers, trucking companies, and
individual workers to call for legislation to overturn Dynamex.128 In their
marketing materials on the “I’m Independent Coalition” website, the
Chamber of Commerce describes Dynamex as “overturn[ing] . . . em-
ployment law that allowed individuals to work as independent
contractors.”129
Worker advocate groups, such as the California Labor Federation,
voiced opposition against business groups’ efforts to overturn
Dynamex.130 In a letter to then-Governor Brown, they voiced their oppo-
127 Josh Eidelson, Gig Firms ask California to Rescue Them from Court Ruling, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 6, 2018, 12:15 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-05/gig-firms-ask-cali
fornia-dems-to-rescue-them-from-court-ruling.
128 Id.
129 About Us, I’M INDEPENDENT COALITION, IMINDEPENENT.CO, https://imindependent.co/
about/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
130 Eidelson, supra note 122.
15
Chavez: Comment
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2020
162 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
sition to any attempt to “delay or alter” the Dynamex ruling.131 Labor
groups immediately voiced support for a new bill to codify Dynamex.132
Furthermore, labor groups expressed their openness to incorporating
changes to the bill to “clear up the intent” of the test to prevent liability
for small businesses that, for example, bring a one-time contractor to
perform a service.133
In December 2018, Assembly Member Lorena Gonzalez introduced
Assembly Bill 5 to codify the Dynamex decision and clarify its applica-
tion.134 Assembly Member Gonzalez commented that maintaining the
new Dynamex standard was “essential for maintaining solid employment
for workers in a changing economy.”135 She added that AB 5 offered a
quicker resolution than litigation to addressing Dynamex’s implications
for issues like workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance.136
In a contentious process with many competing interests, the bill was re-
written a half-dozen times.137
Governor Gavin Newsom signed AB 5 in its final form on Septem-
ber 18, 2019.138 Under AB 5, effective January 1, 2020, California work-
ers are classified as employees by default, unless their employer can
show they can satisfy all three prongs under Dynamex’s “ABC” Test:
(A) the worker is free form control by the hiring entity; and (B) the
worker performs work outside the usual course of business as the hiring
entity; and (C) the worker is customarily engaged in an established trade,
occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed.139
While several occupations are exempted from AB 5, app-based compa-
nies are not exempt from the law.140
After failed efforts to secure an exception under AB 5, Uber, Lyft,
and DoorDash pledged $90 million for a ballot initiative seeking to ex-
131 Id.
132 Alexei Koseff, Labor Pushes to Protect California Ruling that Redefines Who is an Em-
ployee, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 3, 2018, 6:10 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-govern
ment/capitol-alert/article222466405.html.
133 Id.
134 Assemb. B. 5, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
135 Koseff, supra note 127.
136 Id.
137 John Myers, Johana Bhuiyan, Margot Roosevelt, Newsom Signs Bill Rewriting California




139 CAL. LAB. CODE, § 2750.3 (2020).
140 Id.
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empt its drivers from AB 5.141 Though the initiative claims that drivers
will receive guaranteed pay equal to 120% the minimum wage, econo-
mists estimate that the pay guarantee for drivers under the ballot initia-
tive is the equivalent of $5.64 per hour.142 Most recently, Uber and Lyft
filed a lawsuit in federal court attempting to block AB 5 and arguing that
it violates equal protection and due process under state and federal
law.143
Despite AB 5’s numerous exceptions, 64% of workers who are inde-
pendent contractors at their main job are now subject to the “ABC”
Test.144 If the law survives the challenges mounted against it, it stands to
significantly curb misclassification. Importantly, AB 5 empowers the At-
torney General and certain city attorneys to bring action for injunctive
relief against companies suspected of misclassification.145 This provides
for increased enforcement of the law, thereby reducing the incidence of
misclassification by deterring it or suing employers who violate the law.
Altogether, AB 5 offers a promising solution for independent contractor
misclassification because it provides a uniform standard that is easier for
employers to comply with, while providing important enforcement
mechanisms. Nevertheless, AB 5 does not address collective bargaining
for on-demand platform workers. Without collective bargaining, a dys-
functional dichotomy persists by depriving certain workers of the right to
organize for better wages, benefits, and working conditions, effectively
maintaining an underclass of workers.
IV. A PATH FORWARD: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS
Collective bargaining encourages labor and management to negoti-
ate employment relationships that work in the context of the industry,
market, company, and community.146 On average, unionized workers
141 Kate Conger, Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash Pledge $90 Million Fight Driver Legislation in
California, NY TIMES (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/technology/uber-lyft-
ballot-initiative.html.
142 Ken Jacobs & Michael Reich, The Uber/Lyft Ballot Initiative Guarantees only $5.64 per
Hour, UC BERKELEY LAB. CTR. (Oct. 31, 2019), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/the-uber-lyft-ballot-
initiative-guarantees-only-5-64-an-hour/.
143 Uber and Postmates File Lawsuit Challenging California’s New Independent Contractor
Law, NAT’L LAW REV. (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/uber-and-postmates-
file-lawsuit-challenging-california-s-new-independent-contractor.
144 Sarah Thomason, Ken Jacobs, Sharon Jan, Estimating the Coverage of California’s New
AB 5 Law, UC BERKELEY LAB. CTR. (Nov. 2019), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2019/11/Estimating-the-Coverage-of-Californias-New-AB-5-Law.pdf.
145 CAL. LAB. CODE, § 2750.3 (2020).
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earn 16% more than nonunionized workers.147 Union members also pay
more taxes by virtue of earning more income.148 Furthermore, employer
expenditures on fringe benefits are two and a half times higher per hour
for unionized workers.149 Employees may maximize the benefit they de-
rive from an employment relationship through collective bargaining, and
it follows that employees without collective bargaining rights are in a
substandard position of employment than those with collective bargain-
ing rights.
In the private sector, collective bargaining is governed by federal
law under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).150 The NLRA
aims to protect the rights of employees and employers while encouraging
collective bargaining.151 The NLRA explicitly excludes independent
contractors from its definition of “employee.”152 The National Labor Re-
lations Board (“NLRB”), the board that enforces the NLRA, uses a com-
mon-law test to determine whether a worker may be deemed an
employee and subject to protection under the NLRA.153 The NLRB con-
siders the following factors in its inquiry: (a) the extent of control which
the master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether the one
employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) whether the
work is done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist with-
out supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; (e)
whether the employer or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place of work; (f) the length of time the person is employed; (g)
the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or
not the work is part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether
or not the parties believe they are creating a master-servant relationship;
and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business.154 Under this test,
many workers considered employees under the “ABC” Test may not be
employees under the NLRB’s test.
The NLRB issued an advice memo concluding that Uber drivers are
independent contractors under its common-law test.155 Therefore, the
NLRB foreclosed the possibility of granting ride- share workers access to
147 Id.
148 Id.; see also Aaron Sojourner & José Pacas, The Relationship Between Union Membership
and Net Fiscal Impact, IZA INST. OF LAB. ECON. 2, (Jan. 2018), http://ftp.iza.org/dp11310.pdf.
149 Aaron Sojourner & José Pacas, The Relationship Between Union Membership and Net
Fiscal Impact, IZA INST. OF LAB. ECON. 2, (Jan. 2018), http://ftp.iza.org/dp11310.pdf.
150 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2019).
151 § 151.
152 Id.
153 SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 NLRB No. 75 (2019).
154 SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 NLRB No. 75 (2019).
155 NLRB Advice Memo, Uber Technologies, Inc. Case Nos. 13-CA-163062 and 14-CA-
158833 & 29-CA-177 483 (Apr. 16, 2019).
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collective bargaining protections for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless,
workers, labor organizations, and governments may consider novel
frameworks by which gig-economy workers may access collective bar-
gaining because without access to collective bargaining, many gig-econ-
omy workers will remain in a subpar employment position.
A. CREATING A STATE LABOR RELATIONS SCHEME FOR INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS
California lawmakers ought to consider creating a state regulatory
scheme granting collective bargaining rights to workers who are viewed
as independent contractors by the NLRB. California would thereby cre-
ate its own version of the NLRA for this class of workers. Workers who
are employees under the “ABC” Test and independent contractors under
the NLRB’s common-law test are in a unique position because of their
hybrid status for the purpose of collective bargaining. Since the NLRA
does not provide protection to this hybrid class of employee-independent
contractors, a state law specifically tailored to empower hybrid em-
ployee-independent contractors to collectively bargain would offer a new
opportunity for them to engage in collective bargaining to improve their
working conditions.
Some may argue that such a labor relations scheme would be pre-
empted because the NLRA already governs labor relations and collective
bargaining. However, it would likely avoid preemption, as the NLRA has
left open the field for regulation of independent-contractor labor relations
and collective bargaining.156 The NLRA excludes independent contrac-
tors from its purview, and this allows state law to fill in to regulate in the
area of hybrid employee-independent contractor labor relations.
The Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA”) provides a model
for a labor relations scheme for independent contractors. The ALRA
emerged to fill a gap federal law left open.157 The NLRA’s exclusion of
agricultural workers allowed California to create the ALRA to protect
workers otherwise left without collective bargaining protection and
therefore subject to exploitation.158 The ALRA was created pursuant to
California’s policy:
to encourage and protect the right of agricultural employees to full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions
156 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2019).
157 CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166.3 (2019).
158 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2019).
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of their employment, and to be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of
such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activ-
ities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection. For this purpose this part is adopted to provide for collec-
tive-bargaining rights for agricultural employees.159
A state regulatory scheme for independent-contractor collective bargain-
ing may be subject to an antitrust challenge under the Sherman Act be-
cause collective bargaining may inhibit competition between
independent contractors.160 However, it would likely survive such a chal-
lenge. Under Parker v. Brown, state and municipal authorities are im-
mune from federal antitrust lawsuits for actions taken pursuant to a
clearly expressed state policy that, when legislated, had foreseeable an-
ticompetitive effects.161 California lawmakers may frame the stated pol-
icy purpose of the independent contractor collective bargaining law as a
mechanism to facilitate commerce and protect its residents from substan-
dard working conditions, thereby countering antitrust challenges. Fur-
thermore, the hybrid employee-independent contractor workers subject to
the regulatory scheme would bear little resemblance to business owners
in any significant way, thus further undermining any serious antitrust
challenge. Though erecting a regulatory scheme and corresponding
agency requires a vast amount of resources, California may find it a
worthwhile option to consider to protect its workforce and economy.
B. THE GUILD MODEL
Another option that workers and labor groups should consider is or-
ganizing a guild for independent contractors. A guild is an association of
people in shared occupations who work collectively to pursue mutual
goals.162 Guilds existed for thousands of years, dating back to the medie-
val ages.163 Historically, guilds worked together to set prices for goods,
facilitate contract enforcement, and solve information asymmetries.164 A
guild is distinct from a labor union because labor unions represent em-
ployees that work for a common employer, while guilds provide an orga-
nizational mechanism by which independent contractors or business
159 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1140.2 (2019).
160 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2019) (The Sherman Act prohibits activities that inhibit interstate com-
merce and market competition).
161 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
162 Sheila Ogilvie, The Economics of Guilds, 28 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 169, 169-70
(2014).
163 Id. at 170-71.
164 Id. at 174.
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owners can negotiate collectively with decision-makers to advocate for
their shared interests.165 Unlike labor unions, guilds are not subject to the
rights and responsibilities granted to unions under the NLRA.166 Thus,
employers are not obligated to bargain with guilds over wages, benefits,
or working conditions.167
Recently, a group of independent contractor ride-share drivers in
New York organized a guild to negotiate with Uber over improvements
to their working conditions.168 The guild formed a compensation fund
that provides substitute income for injured drivers when they are hurt and
unable to work.169 Furthermore, the guild has successfully advocated for
higher pay, access to restrooms for drivers while on the road, and
healthcare.170
California gig-economy workers could benefit from following suit
and organizing a guild to negotiate with technology companies for better
wages and increased protections. Absent legislation to form a state regu-
latory scheme allowing independent contractors to unionize, the guild
model would afford independent contractors with the greatest leverage to
demand better wages and more protections through collective action. For
example, workers may bargain collectively to demand that technology
companies contribute to a welfare fund to provide healthcare coverage
and protections for injured workers, as well as to increase the rates paid
to workers.
However, given that guilds do not have the right to compel a com-
pany to negotiate like unions do, gig-economy companies may refuse to
recognize the guild and refuse to negotiate with it. If gig-economy com-
panies agree to negotiate with the guild, technology companies may de-
mand that the guild concede that its workers are, in fact, not employees.
By collectively resigning to and accepting the independent-contractor
status, gig-economy workers would be perpetually cast as second-class
workers and would be worse off in the long term. Nevertheless, absent a
more viable option, the guild model would be an effective vehicle to
bring about improvements to the wages, benefits, and working conditions
of gig-economy workers.
165 GUILD ASS’N, https://guildassociation.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2019).
166 My Employer Says I am an Independent Contractor. What Does That Mean?, COMM.
WORKERS OF AM., https://cwa-union.org/about/rights-on-job/legal-toolkit/my-employer-says-i-am-
independent-contractor-what-does-mean (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
167 Id.
168 About the IDG, INDEP. DRIVERS GUILD, https://drivingguild.org/about/ (last visited Mar.
10, 2019).
169 Id.
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CONCLUSION
Independent-contractor misclassification is a serious problem that
has received large-scale attention from lawmakers and the public over
the past two years as a result of the landmark Dynamex decision. Though
Dynamex fell short of providing a standard that would effectively curb
misclassification, it provided a clear “ABC” Test to replace the tradi-
tional multi-factor test.171 Nevertheless, Dynamex created an unworkable
dichotomy by applying the new “ABC” Test to Wage Order claims,
while maintaining the traditional multi-factor test for Labor Code claims.
This created the potential for situations where some employees would
fall under the purview of some California employment protections, but
not others.
AB 5 cured Dynamex’s most substantial defect by codifying the
“ABC” Test as the standard test for determining employee versus inde-
pendent contractor status under the Labor Code.172 AB 5 provides uni-
formity and predictability regarding who is an employee and who is an
independent contractor. However, it does not ensure that all workers
classified as employees under its “ABC” Test have access to collective
bargaining.
The ills of misclassification will persist so long as collective bar-
gaining is denied to some employees. Without access to collective bar-
gaining employees do not have the right to negotiate with their employer
to address grievances and improve working conditions. Employee status
alone is insufficient to allow workers to gain access to livable wages and
fair working conditions. California must take its work one step further
than AB 5 by enacting a statewide regulatory scheme modeled after the
ALRA to allow workers who are employees under AB 5 and whom the
NLRB does not recognize as employees to engage in collective bargain-
ing. Alternatively, gig-economy workers should consider organizing a
guild for industry-wide bargaining with the gig-economy companies that
employ them.
California’s bold action to combat misclassification is a model for
other jurisdictions to follow. AB 5 brings workers into the purview of
California employment protections. However, it does not provide them a
vehicle to seek wages, benefits, and working conditions above the mini-
mum protections the Labor Code provides. Collective bargaining is the
remaining component necessary to allow California gig-economy work-
ers the greatest opportunity to fair wages, benefits, and working
conditions.
171 Dynamex Operations W., 4 Cal. 5th at 964.
172 CAL. LAB. CODE, § 2750.3 (2020).
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